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May 13, 2026

Daily Threat Intelligence Report โ€” 2025-07-14

24
IOCs
12
TTPs
15
KQL Queries
Executive Summary

Today's threat landscape is dominated by active QakBot and Emotet command-and-control infrastructure confirmed by Feodotracker across US, UK, and Japanese IP space, alongside a cluster of ValleyRAT and SilverFox malware samples identified in MalwareBazaar indicating active loader campaigns. CISA has added five critical vulnerabilities to the KEV catalog โ€” including a Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS out-of-bounds write (CVE-2026-0300) allowing unauthenticated RCE with root privileges and an Ivanti EPMM authenticated RCE (CVE-2026-6973) โ€” demanding immediate patching priority. A MuddyWater-attributed espionage campaign targeting electronics manufacturers across nine countries and a supply-chain attack compromising 84 TanStack npm packages (attributed to TeamPCP) represent significant ongoing strategic threats per AlienVault OTX. SOC teams should immediately block all five Feodotracker C2 IPs, prioritise PAN-OS and Ivanti EPMM patching, and audit CI/CD pipelines for compromised TanStack dependencies.

#1

Active QakBot and Emotet C2 Infrastructure โ€” Multi-Region Botnet Operations Confirmed

CRITICAL TA505

Feodotracker has confirmed five active command-and-control servers operational within the last 24 hours: four QakBot C2 nodes hosted across the US (50.16.16.211, 34.204.119.63), UK (178.62.3.223), and Japan (27.133.154.218), and one Emotet C2 node in the US (162.243.103.246). QakBot and Emotet are primary initial-access and post-exploitation tools historically associated with TA505 and related ransomware-as-a-service ecosystems, used for credential harvesting, lateral movement, and ransomware staging. The geographic distribution of C2 infrastructure across three countries suggests active infrastructure rotation to evade single-country blocking strategies. MalwareBazaar corroborates active loader activity with a confirmed AgentTesla sample (4a4d0da0f8c4cd9a46178150f755a1348100b2c5b471874f8a898258c39a26a4) and additional RemoteManipulator tooling, consistent with post-QakBot/Emotet access monetisation patterns.

๐Ÿ”ด Indicators of Compromise
IP 162.243.103.246 Emotet C2 server โ€” US-hosted, Feodotracker confirmed active within 24h
IP 50.16.16.211 QakBot C2 server โ€” US-hosted, Feodotracker confirmed active within 24h
IP 34.204.119.63 QakBot C2 server โ€” US-hosted, Feodotracker confirmed active within 24h
IP 178.62.3.223 QakBot C2 server โ€” UK-hosted, Feodotracker confirmed active within 24h
IP 27.133.154.218 QakBot C2 server โ€” JP-hosted, Feodotracker confirmed active within 24h
HASH 4a4d0da0f8c4cd9a46178150f755a1348100b2c5b471874f8a898258c39a26a4 AgentTesla credential-stealing payload โ€” PE executable, MalwareBazaar confirmed
HASH acae87a39faff99d12c7bd853c2f7cd74380f253a5c87770b9f7e13a4bd6a425 RemoteManipulator signed executable โ€” remote access tool, MalwareBazaar confirmed
URL http://78.165.194.157:51999/i Active malware download URL โ€” likely QakBot/Emotet dropper payload delivery, URLhaus confirmed
URL http://222.139.83.246:34217/i Active malware download URL โ€” malware_download classification, URLhaus confirmed
๐ŸŸฃ MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment MITRE โ†’
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols MITRE โ†’
T1056.001 Keylogging MITRE โ†’
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer MITRE โ†’
๐ŸŸข Hunt Queries
MDE Hunt for C2 Connections to QakBot and Emotet Infrastructure

Detects outbound network connections to all five Feodotracker-confirmed QakBot and Emotet C2 servers active in the last 24 hours.

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in ('162.243.103.246', '50.16.16.211', '34.204.119.63', '178.62.3.223', '27.133.154.218')
| where ActionType == 'ConnectionSuccess'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
MDE Detect AgentTesla and RemoteManipulator by File Hash

Identifies creation or execution of AgentTesla and RemoteManipulator payloads confirmed by MalwareBazaar on any endpoint in the environment.

DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where SHA256 in ('4a4d0da0f8c4cd9a46178150f755a1348100b2c5b471874f8a898258c39a26a4', 'acae87a39faff99d12c7bd853c2f7cd74380f253a5c87770b9f7e13a4bd6a425')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
MDE Detect Malware Download URL Access โ€” URLhaus Confirmed Infrastructure

Identifies endpoint connections to URLhaus-confirmed malware download URLs associated with QakBot/Emotet payload staging infrastructure.

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in ('78.165.194.157', '222.139.83.246', '27.150.252.2', '39.76.57.14', '182.116.20.177', '42.227.204.211', '175.167.86.226', '182.121.109.8', '182.120.98.66')
| where ActionType in ('ConnectionSuccess', 'ConnectionAttempt')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SENTINEL QakBot and Emotet C2 Beaconing Detection via Firewall/Proxy Logs

Detects connections to Feodotracker-confirmed C2 IPs across network perimeter devices feeding into Sentinel.

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DestinationIP in ('162.243.103.246', '50.16.16.211', '34.204.119.63', '178.62.3.223', '27.133.154.218')
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, RequestURL, Activity, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct
| order by TimeGenerated desc
MDI Detect Lateral Movement Following QakBot/Emotet Compromise

Hunts for suspicious NTLM-based lateral movement patterns consistent with post-QakBot credential harvesting and network traversal activity.

IdentityLogonEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == 'LogonSuccess'
| where Protocol == 'Ntlm'
| summarize LogonCount=count(), DistinctDevices=dcount(DeviceName) by AccountDisplayName, IPAddress
| where LogonCount > 5 or DistinctDevices > 3
| order by LogonCount desc
โœ… Recommended Actions
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Block all five Feodotracker-confirmed C2 IPs (162.243.103.246, 50.16.16.211, 34.204.119.63, 178.62.3.223, 27.133.154.218) at perimeter firewall, web proxy, and NGFW with deny-and-log rules
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Submit hashes 4a4d0da0f8c4cd9a46178150f755a1348100b2c5b471874f8a898258c39a26a4 (AgentTesla) and acae87a39faff99d12c7bd853c2f7cd74380f253a5c87770b9f7e13a4bd6a425 (RemoteManipulator) to EDR platform for immediate block-and-quarantine
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Block all nine URLhaus-listed malware download IPs at egress firewall and add to threat intelligence platform block list
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Execute all five KQL hunting queries across MDE, Sentinel, and MDI environments and triage any hits within 2 hours
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Alert SOC L2/L3 to monitor for NTLM authentication anomalies indicating post-Emotet/QakBot lateral movement
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Scan email gateway quarantine for messages with Office macro-enabled attachments delivered in the last 48 hours
โ†’ LONG-TERM: Ingest all Feodotracker and URLhaus IOCs from this report into SIEM threat intelligence feeds for automated detection
โ†’ LONG-TERM: Evaluate deployment of macro-execution blocking Group Policy for Office applications across the enterprise
#2

ValleyRAT/SilverFox Loader Campaign and ZigClipper Clipper Malware Active โ€” Windows Endpoint Targeting

HIGH Unknown Threat Actor

MalwareBazaar has identified multiple active malware samples within the last 24 hours including two ValleyRAT/SilverFox loader executables (hashes: 2323b5a8e01c2ec1ac3ebc05317dac329c87d4ff54e8f2214672e81fd9728939 and 791b8b0ae50f56089a9fff33d391a99ab56da62adf19825e716d86bda075f1c5), a malicious Agent executable (240736de9d08d836e979156a5bdc29a94dba0bff0ffffab49e9887452773a8b7), and two ZigClipper samples (36c005a6cb62dd768959b6841d9e7c596089d948e9f5f6f4eedf858c30017b9a and 6356a12295738d0badce36a73faa2051778f2c5368e70393a042942338846cbb) tagged as dropped by ACRStealer via the domain sp13-gstats-api-coni-co. ValleyRAT is a sophisticated multi-stage RAT with capabilities for remote command execution, file operations, and persistence, while ZigClipper intercepts and replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses in clipboard content to redirect transactions to attacker-controlled wallets. The ACRStealer dropper relationship confirms a chained infection pipeline: initial access via stealer, followed by clipboard hijacking for financial theft โ€” a pattern increasingly observed in cryptocurrency-targeting campaigns. GitHub activity from stamparm/maltrail also recorded updates to ClearFake and PureLogs tracking files, corroborating an active exploit-kit and stealer ecosystem consistent with this campaign.

๐Ÿ”ด Indicators of Compromise
HASH 2323b5a8e01c2ec1ac3ebc05317dac329c87d4ff54e8f2214672e81fd9728939 ValleyRAT/SilverFox loader โ€” PE executable, MalwareBazaar confirmed active
HASH 791b8b0ae50f56089a9fff33d391a99ab56da62adf19825e716d86bda075f1c5 ValleyRAT Agent loader โ€” PE executable, MalwareBazaar confirmed active
HASH 240736de9d08d836e979156a5bdc29a94dba0bff0ffffab49e9887452773a8b7 Malicious Agent executable โ€” PE executable, MalwareBazaar confirmed malicious
HASH 36c005a6cb62dd768959b6841d9e7c596089d948e9f5f6f4eedf858c30017b9a ZigClipper clipboard hijacker โ€” dropped by ACRStealer via sp13-gstats-api-coni-co, MalwareBazaar confirmed
HASH 6356a12295738d0badce36a73faa2051778f2c5368e70393a042942338846cbb ZigClipper clipboard hijacker โ€” dropped by ACRStealer via sp13-gstats-api-coni-co, MalwareBazaar confirmed
DOMAIN sp13-gstats-api-coni-co ACRStealer dropper distribution domain โ€” associated with ZigClipper delivery chain, MalwareBazaar tag confirmed
URL https://root-directory-repository-process-vault.wiki/11dfc84c-d5b6-4d0f-bc00-ff3e5cbf8010/google.ct Active malware download URL using deceptive wiki domain mimicking legitimate repository โ€” URLhaus confirmed
URL http://27.150.252.2:56569/bin.sh Shell script malware downloader โ€” likely Linux/IoT dropper staging, URLhaus confirmed
๐ŸŸฃ MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
T1055 Process Injection MITRE โ†’
T1115 Clipboard Data MITRE โ†’
T1059.001 PowerShell MITRE โ†’
T1176 Browser Extensions MITRE โ†’
๐ŸŸข Hunt Queries
MDE Detect ValleyRAT, SilverFox, and ZigClipper by File Hash

Identifies creation, modification, or execution of ValleyRAT, SilverFox Agent loader, and ZigClipper clipboard hijacker payloads confirmed by MalwareBazaar in the last 24 hours.

DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where SHA256 in (
    '2323b5a8e01c2ec1ac3ebc05317dac329c87d4ff54e8f2214672e81fd9728939',
    '791b8b0ae50f56089a9fff33d391a99ab56da62adf19825e716d86bda075f1c5',
    '240736de9d08d836e979156a5bdc29a94dba0bff0ffffab49e9887452773a8b7',
    '36c005a6cb62dd768959b6841d9e7c596089d948e9f5f6f4eedf858c30017b9a',
    '6356a12295738d0badce36a73faa2051778f2c5368e70393a042942338846cbb'
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
MDE Detect ACRStealer Distribution Domain Network Connections

Identifies outbound connections to the ACRStealer dropper distribution domain associated with ZigClipper delivery chain as tagged in MalwareBazaar.

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has 'sp13-gstats-api-coni-co' or RemoteUrl has 'root-directory-repository-process-vault.wiki'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
MDE Detect Suspicious Clipboard Access โ€” ZigClipper Behaviour Pattern

Hunts for non-standard processes making high-frequency clipboard API calls consistent with ZigClipper clipboard hijacking behaviour targeting cryptocurrency wallet addresses.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('OpenClipboard', 'SetClipboardData', 'GetClipboardData')
    or FileName !in ('chrome.exe', 'msedge.exe', 'firefox.exe', 'WINWORD.EXE', 'EXCEL.EXE', 'explorer.exe', 'Teams.exe')
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ('svchost.exe', 'explorer.exe', 'RuntimeBroker.exe')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName, FolderPath
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SENTINEL Detect Connections to ClearFake and Malware Download Infrastructure

Detects network connections to URLhaus-confirmed malware download URLs associated with the ClearFake exploit kit and ValleyRAT delivery infrastructure tracked by stamparm/maltrail.

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any ('root-directory-repository-process-vault.wiki', 'sp13-gstats-api-coni-co')
    or DestinationIP in ('27.150.252.2', '39.76.57.14', '182.116.20.177', '175.167.86.226', '182.120.98.66')
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, RequestURL, Activity, DeviceVendor
| order by TimeGenerated desc
MDE Detect Suspicious PowerShell Execution โ€” ClearFake Loader Pattern

Identifies PowerShell execution with encoded commands or download cradles consistent with ClearFake exploit-kit delivery of ValleyRAT and SilverFox loaders.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ 'powershell.exe' or FileName =~ 'pwsh.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('-EncodedCommand', '-enc', 'IEX', 'Invoke-Expression', 'DownloadString', 'DownloadFile', 'WebClient', 'Net.WebClient')
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ('chrome.exe', 'msedge.exe', 'firefox.exe', 'iexplore.exe', 'mshta.exe', 'wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName, FolderPath
| order by TimeGenerated desc
โœ… Recommended Actions
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Block all five MalwareBazaar-confirmed hashes (ValleyRAT x2, Agent x1, ZigClipper x2) in EDR platform with quarantine action
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Block domain sp13-gstats-api-coni-co and URL root-directory-repository-process-vault.wiki at DNS firewall and web proxy
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Alert SOC to run ZigClipper clipboard-access detection query and triage any systems accessing cryptocurrency-related websites
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Notify users with cryptocurrency wallets or access to financial applications to verify wallet addresses before transactions
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Run ValleyRAT/SilverFox hash detection query across all Windows endpoints via MDE advanced hunting
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Review ClearFake maltrail GitHub updates (stamparm/maltrail) for additional IOCs and ingest into SIEM
โ†’ LONG-TERM: Implement PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and enable Script Block Logging across all endpoints
โ†’ LONG-TERM: Deploy application allowlisting to prevent execution of unsigned PE executables from user-writable directories
#3

CISA KEV: Five Critical Vulnerabilities Actively Exploited โ€” PAN-OS, Ivanti EPMM, Linux Kernel, cPanel, and LiteLLM Require Immediate Patching

MEDIUM Unknown Threat Actor

CISA has added five vulnerabilities to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, confirming active exploitation in the wild. The most critical is CVE-2026-0300 in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS โ€” an out-of-bounds write in the User-ID Authentication Portal (Captive Portal) allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls; this represents a network perimeter compromise risk of the highest severity. CVE-2026-6973 in Ivanti EPMM allows a remotely authenticated administrative user to achieve RCE, threatening mobile device management infrastructure. CVE-2026-41940 in WebPros cPanel and WHM enables unauthenticated authentication bypass giving attackers full control panel access, while CVE-2026-31431 in the Linux Kernel allows local privilege escalation via incorrect resource transfer. CVE-2026-42208 in BerriAI LiteLLM introduces SQL injection enabling unauthorized read/write access to AI proxy credentials โ€” a significant risk for organisations using LLM infrastructure. All five require immediate remediation per BOD 22-01 guidance.

๐Ÿ”ด Indicators of Compromise
CVE CVE-2026-0300 Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS โ€” Unauthenticated RCE with root privileges via Captive Portal out-of-bounds write โ€” CISA KEV confirmed actively exploited
CVE CVE-2026-6973 Ivanti EPMM โ€” Authenticated RCE via improper input validation โ€” CISA KEV confirmed actively exploited
CVE CVE-2026-41940 WebPros cPanel and WHM โ€” Unauthenticated authentication bypass granting full control panel access โ€” CISA KEV confirmed actively exploited
CVE CVE-2026-31431 Linux Kernel โ€” Local privilege escalation via incorrect resource transfer between spheres โ€” CISA KEV confirmed actively exploited
CVE CVE-2026-42208 BerriAI LiteLLM โ€” SQL injection enabling unauthorized database read/write and credential access โ€” CISA KEV confirmed actively exploited
URL http://meta-id19239273.invoice-ads-program.com/ Active phishing URL mimicking Meta โ€” likely used for credential harvesting supporting broader exploitation campaigns, OpenPhish confirmed
URL https://dpuqq-anbp-t8kh.c-1o2k0n4w.workers.dev/lp/36gE3Qf8hqs/ Cloudflare Workers-hosted phishing page โ€” evasion via CDN infrastructure, OpenPhish confirmed
๐ŸŸฃ MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application MITRE โ†’
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation MITRE โ†’
T1078 Valid Accounts MITRE โ†’
T1566.002 Spearphishing Link MITRE โ†’
๐ŸŸข Hunt Queries
SENTINEL Detect Exploitation Attempts Against Palo Alto PAN-OS Captive Portal โ€” CVE-2026-0300

Identifies anomalous access patterns to PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal consistent with CVE-2026-0300 exploitation attempts, including requests from unexpected source IPs and unusual request volumes.

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DeviceVendor == 'Palo Alto Networks'
| where Activity has_any ('captive-portal', 'userid', 'auth-portal', 'User-ID')
| summarize RequestCount=count(), DistinctSourceIPs=dcount(SourceIP) by DestinationIP, Activity, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where RequestCount > 50 or DistinctSourceIPs > 10
| order by RequestCount desc
SENTINEL Detect cPanel Authentication Bypass Attempts โ€” CVE-2026-41940

Identifies suspicious authentication activity against cPanel and WHM control panel interfaces consistent with CVE-2026-41940 unauthenticated bypass exploitation.

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any ('/cpanel', '/whm', '/cpsess', ':2082', ':2083', ':2086', ':2087')
| where Activity has_any ('POST', 'GET')
| summarize AttemptCount=count() by SourceIP, RequestURL, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where AttemptCount > 10
| order by AttemptCount desc
MDE Detect Linux Kernel Privilege Escalation Attempts โ€” CVE-2026-31431

Identifies process execution patterns on Linux endpoints consistent with local privilege escalation exploitation of CVE-2026-31431 in the Linux Kernel.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where OSPlatform == 'Linux'
| where AccountName != 'root' and AccountName != 'system'
| where FileName in ('su', 'sudo', 'pkexec', 'newgrp')
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('chmod +s', 'setuid', 'capsh', '/proc/self/mem')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SENTINEL Detect Access to OpenPhish-Confirmed Phishing Infrastructure

Identifies user or endpoint connections to active phishing URLs confirmed by OpenPhish including Meta impersonation, Steam clone, Netflix clone, and Cloudflare Workers-hosted phishing pages.

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any (
    'meta-id19239273.invoice-ads-program.com',
    'dpuqq-anbp-t8kh.c-1o2k0n4w.workers.dev',
    'yeefish0.github.io/steam_login_auth',
    'dharmateja887.github.io/Netflix_Clone',
    'aicc108-demo.pages.dev',
    'hotel-stay83109.com',
    'robiox.com.ps',
    'httpss-www-roblox.co',
    'novotempoparanovachances.s3.us-east-005.backblazeb2.com',
    'embuscadofinanceiromelhor.s3.us-east-005.backblazeb2.com'
)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, RequestURL, Activity, DeviceVendor
| order by TimeGenerated desc
MDE Detect Ivanti EPMM Exploitation Indicators โ€” CVE-2026-6973

Identifies suspicious process execution originating from Ivanti EPMM service processes consistent with RCE exploitation of CVE-2026-6973.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ('ivanti', 'epmm', 'mobileiron', 'mifs')
| where FileName in ('cmd.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'sh', 'bash', 'python.exe', 'python3', 'perl', 'wget', 'curl')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
โœ… Recommended Actions
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Apply Palo Alto Networks vendor patch for CVE-2026-0300 โ€” until patched, restrict User-ID Authentication Portal to trusted zones only and disable if not required per CISA KEV guidance
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Apply Ivanti EPMM vendor patch for CVE-2026-6973 โ€” audit all administrative accounts for unauthorised access and rotate credentials as precaution
โ†’ IMMEDIATE: Apply WebPros cPanel and WHM patch for CVE-2026-41940 โ€” if patch unavailable, consider temporary restriction of control panel access to trusted IPs only
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Apply Linux Kernel patch for CVE-2026-31431 across all Linux servers and endpoints โ€” prioritise internet-facing and high-value systems
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Apply BerriAI LiteLLM patch for CVE-2026-42208 โ€” rotate all credentials managed by the LiteLLM proxy immediately as a precaution given SQL injection risk
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Block all 15 OpenPhish-confirmed phishing URLs at web proxy and DNS filtering layer โ€” update email gateway with phishing domain blocklist
โ†’ SHORT-TERM: Run all five SENTINEL and MDE KQL queries to identify exploitation attempts and affected systems
โ†’ LONG-TERM: Establish a recurring CISA KEV review process with SLA of 48 hours for critical vulnerabilities affecting internet-facing infrastructure
โ†’ LONG-TERM: Implement network segmentation to restrict access to management interfaces (PAN-OS, Ivanti EPMM, cPanel) to dedicated management VLANs only